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Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. Of Edn.
179 N.E.3d 1169 (2021)
I.

INTRODUCTION

From 2009 to 2019, there were at least 180 school shootings, affecting
at a minimum 356 victims.1 In 2016, one of these school shootings
occurred in the Madison Local School District in Butler County, Ohio,
wounding four students.2 The school system’s Board of Education enacted
a resolution that would arm certain teachers with concealed handguns based
on a determined set of requirements.3
When a group of parents challenged the resolution, the Ohio Supreme
Court eventually heard the case.4 What at first seemed like a dispute about
a school defense policy became a long and convoluted argument between
factions within the court regarding modes and methods of statutory
interpretation.5
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 29, 2016, Madison Junior-Senior High became the site of
an all-too-familiar occurrence: a school shooting.6 A high school student
walked into the school building’s cafeteria and began firing his weapon.7
As a result of the gunman’s actions, four students were injured, and the
shooter was subsequently arrested.8
In April 2018, the Madison Local School District Board (hereinafter
“Board”) took an action it deemed necessary to help prevent and quell any
future active-shooter situations.9 The Board passed a resolution allowing
the superintendent to designate up to ten school employees to carry
1. Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. Of Edn., 179 N.E.3d 1169, 1172 (majority
opinion) (citing Christina Walker, 10 Years. 180 School Shootings. 356 Victims., CNN (accessed June 1,
2021), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/07/us/ten-years-of-school-shootings-trnd/#storystart).
2. Dana Ford, 4 Students Injured in Ohio School Shooting, CNN (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.c
nn.com/2016/02/29/us/ohio-school-incident/index.html.
3. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1174.
4. Id. at 1174-75.
5. Susan Tebben, Ohio Supreme Court: Schools Can’t Arm Teachers without Proper Training,
OH. CAP. J. (June 24, 2021), https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2021/06/24/ohio-supreme-court-schools-cant
-arm-teachers-without-proper-training/.
6. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1172; see also Ford, supra note 2.
7. Ford, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1172; see also Rick McCrabb, Closer Look: Madison School
District’s Plan to Arm Teachers, Staff, JOURNAL-NEWS, (April 25, 2018), https://www.journal-news.com
/news/closer-look-madison-school-district-plan-arm-teachers-staff/uhvquNFHRKDw1j7AFhL9MK/.
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concealed firearms throughout the school so that these faculty members
might use the weapons if facing an active-shooter situation.10 The Board
would then issue a written authorization to each individual, permitting him
or her to carry a weapon as long as he or she met a list of requirements.11
Designated employees were required to: “maintain an Ohio concealedhandgun license, satisfactorily complete at least twenty-four hours of
response-to-active-shooter training, hold a handgun-qualification certificate,
receive training regarding mental preparation to respond to active killers,
and pass a criminal-background check and mental-health exam.”12
The Board’s resolution was met with backlash by some parents,
students, and other community members.13 A group of parents, Erin
Gabbard, Aimee Robson, Dallas Robson, Benjamin Tobey, and Benjamin
Adams (hereinafter “Parents”), sued the Board, seeking both declaratory
judgment and an injunction against the resolution’s application.14 The
sought declaratory judgment asked the court to determine that the Board’s
resolution was in violation of the Ohio Revised Code, specifically R.C.
109.78(D).15 R.C. 109.78(D) reads:
No public or private educational institution or superintendent of the
state highway patrol shall employ a person as a special police
officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes
armed while on duty, who has not received a certificate of having
satisfactorily completed an approved basic peace officer training
program, unless the person has completed twenty years of active
duty as a peace officer.16
The Parents argued that teachers or administrators qualified as “other
position[s] in which such person goes armed while on duty,” and, thus, they
must either have training as a peace officer or have previously completed
twenty years of active duty as a peace officer.17 Peace officer training
requires at least 728 hours to complete and necessitates a background check,
10. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1174.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Marianna Bettman, Oral Argument Preview: How Much Training Is Required for School
Teachers and Staff to Carry Firearms in Ohio’s Schools?, LEGALLY SPEAKING OHIO (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://legallyspeakingohio.com/2021/01/oral-argument-preview-how-much-training-is-required-forschool-teachers-and-staff-to-carry-firearms-in-ohios-schools-erin-g-gabbard-et-al-v-madison-localschool-district-board-of-educat/; see also Jessica Schmidt, Parents Take Stand Against School’s
Decision to Allow Armed Staff, FOX19 (Jul. 12, 2018), https://www.fox19.com/story/38626213/parentsnonprofit-take-stand-against-madison-resolution-to-arm-school-staff/.
14. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1174.
15. Id.
16. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.78(D) (2021).
17. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1174.
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a fitness test, and a drug screening.18 According to the Parents, the Board’s
resolution required twenty-four hours of response-to-active-shooter training,
which is not nearly enough instruction to satisfy the requirements of R.C.
109.78(D).19
The Board countered, saying that R.C. 109.78(D) was not meant to
apply to teachers or administrators, and the Board asserted that it was
specifically empowered through a different statute, R.C. 2923.122.20 This
statute “defines the criminal offense of illegal conveyance into or
possession in a school safety zone of a deadly weapon or dangerous
ordnance.”21 Sections (A) and (B) of the statute forbid any person from
“knowingly conveying or attempting to convey into or possessing” a
weapon in a school safety zone, which is defined as a “school, school
building, school premises, school activity, and school bus.”22 However,
R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) exempts criminal liability for the following:
[A] law enforcement officer who is authorized to carry deadly
weapons or dangerous ordnance, a security officer employed by a
board of education or governing body of a school during the time
that the security officer is on duty pursuant to that contract of
employment, or any other person who has written authorization
from the board of education or governing body of a school to
convey deadly weapons or dangerous ordnance into a school safety
zone or possess a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in a school
safety zone and who conveys or possesses the deadly weapon or
dangerous ordnance in accordance with that authorization.23
The Board argued that since it provided written authorization to the ten
designated armed employees, the language of R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a)
shielded those teachers or administrators from any criminal liability.24
Therefore, the Board maintained that it was acting within the authority
granted under R.C. 2923.122 and that the designated employees were not
required to complete the peace officer training required under R.C.
109.78(D).25

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Bettman, supra note 13.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1173.
Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(C)(1) (2021).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.122(D)(1)(a) (2021).
Bettman, supra note 13.
Id.
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The Parents’ suit was heard in the Butler County Common Pleas Court,
where the court entered summary judgment for the Board.26 The trial court
found that R.C. 109.78(D) was only applicable to people employed to
perform duties in a police-like capacity and was not germane to teachers,
administrators, and other school employees.27 Thus, the trial court
concluded that the training requirements of R.C. 109.78(D) were not
compulsory for the ten designated school employees described in the
Board’s resolution.28 Further, the court found that the Board was within its
authority to enable certain employees to carry concealed weapons on school
premises under R.C. 2923.122.29
The Parents appealed, and by a 2-1 decision, the Twelfth District Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment.30 The majority found that
the trial court read R.C. 109.78(D) too narrowly and that its language was
unambiguous and was meant to be applied to all school staff, including
teachers and administrators.31 The majority held that the peace officer
training requirements were mandatory for all school employees, and,
therefore, the Board’s resolution was in violation of R.C. 109.78(D).32 The
Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear the Board’s appeal of the Twelfth
District’s judgment and to determine whether R.C. 109.78(D) was
applicable to all school employees.33
III.

COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Majority Opinion by Chief Justice O’Connor

Chief Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the court, joined by
Justices Brunner, Donnelly, and Stewart.34 The Chief Justice began by
describing the court’s processes for analyzing a statute, stating that the
primary goal is to understand the legislature’s intent for creating the law.35
Specifically, the majority stated that “when the statutory language is
26. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1174.
27. Id. at 1174-75.
28. Id. at 1175.
29. Id. at 1174-75.
30. Id. at 1175 (citing Gabbard v. Madison Local Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 2020-Ohio-1180, 153
N.E.3d 471, ¶¶ 21, 32. (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) [hereinafter Madison]); Bettman, supra note 13.
31. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1175 (citing Madison, 2020-Ohio-1180 at ¶¶ 17-19).
32. Id.
33. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1175.
34. Marianna Bettman, Merit Decision: Armed Teachers Must Meet Statutory Training-orExperience Requirements, LEGALLY SPEAKING OHIO (July 16, 2021),
https://legallyspeakingohio.com/2021/07/merit-decision-armed-teachers-must-meet-statutory-Trainingor-Experience-requirements-erin-g-gabbard-et-al-v-madison-local-school-district-board-of-education-etal/ [hereinafter Merit Decision].
35. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1175 (citing State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355,
2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21).
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unambiguous, [the court will] apply it as written without resorting to rules
of statutory interpretation or considerations of public policy.”36 The Chief
Justice emphasized that the court’s review begins and ends with the
“unambiguous statutory language.”37
The majority set aside the Board’s argument that R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a) gives the Board permission to authorize school
employees to carry concealed weapons on school property.38 Instead, the
court determined that the crucial question that must be answered in this case
is the pertinence of R.C. 109.78(D).39 Specifically, the court sought to
resolve whether school employees (teachers, administrators, etc.) who carry
weapons while performing their assigned duties are considered an “other
position in which such person goes armed while on duty” according to the
plain language of R.C. 109.78(D).40 If the court decided that school
employees do fall under this category, then, under R.C. 109.78(D), in order
to carry a weapon on school premises, these employees would be required
to either attend peace officer training or have at least twenty years of
experience as a peace officer (hereinafter referred to as the “Training-orExperience” requirement).41
The court began by looking at the plain language of R.C. 109.78(D).42
The statute bars schools from employing any “person as a special police
officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes armed
while on duty” unless the person has satisfied the Training-or-Experience
requirement.43 The Chief Justice emphasized that neither the Board nor the
Parents argued that the language of R.C. 109.78(D) is ambiguous.44
However, the court noted that the major disagreement between the two sides
was in their readings and understandings of the statute’s “other position in
which such person goes armed while on duty” clause (hereinafter referred to
as the “Clause”).45 The Board argued that this Clause only applied to school
employees whose specific duties were to “serve in safety or security
positions that inherently require the employee to be armed.”46 However, the

36. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1175 (citing Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist.,
128 Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603, 946 N.E.2d 748, ¶¶ 23-24, 26).
37. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1175 (citing Johnson v. Montgomery, 151 Ohio St.3d 75, 2017Ohio-7445, 86 N.E.3d 279, ¶ 15).
38. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1175.
39. Id. at 1175-76.
40. Id. (quoting § 109.78(D)).
41. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1175-76.
42. Id. at 1176.
43. Id. (quoting § 109.78(D)).
44. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1176.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Parents maintained that the Clause referred to all school employees,
regardless of their assigned duties.47
To interpret the Clause, the court examined several of the words and
phrases located within it.48 It began by defining “other position,” saying
that “in the context of employment, the ordinary meaning of the word
‘position’ is a job.”49 The court went further, saying that “other” clearly
modified “position,” making the “other position” different from the two
previously listed job categories (special police officer or security guard).50
Therefore, the court held that a “school employee who is not employed as a
special police officer or security guard is employed in an ‘other position.’”51
The majority continued by examining which “other position[s]” were
required to meet the Training-or-Experience condition.52 From the plain
language of the statute, the court determined that only school employees
who held a “position ‘in which [the employee] goes armed while on duty’”
needed to meet the requirements of R.C. 109.78(D).53 Thus, the statute
limited which employees needed to meet the Training-or-Experience
requirement to only those school employees who would be armed while
performing their regular duties.54 In the case of the Madison Local School
District, the statute’s Training-or-Experience mandate would apply only to
the ten school employees designated as being allowed to carry firearms on
school premises.55
The court acknowledged that the Board argued that the Training-orExperience requirement should only apply to school employees whose
actual duties relate to being armed.56 The Board claimed that a teacher’s or
an administrator’s actual responsibilities do not typically involve the
possession of a concealed weapon, and, thus, the Board argued that the
Clause did not apply to school employees.57 However, the court rejected
this interpretation, saying that the Board’s construing of the Clause would
require a rewording of the language of R.C. 109.78(D).58 Specifically, the
Board’s reading would have changed the wording of the Clause from “other
position in which such employee goes armed while on duty” to “other
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1176 (citing Position, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987)).
50. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1176.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1177.
53. Id. (quoting § 109.78(D)).
54. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1177.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Bettman, supra note 13.
58. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1177.
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position ‘the duties of which involve being armed.’”59 The Chief Justice
stressed that the General Assembly could have chosen to use language to fit
the Board’s argument, but it did not.60 Quoting a previous case, the Chief
Justice wrote, “[I]f the General Assembly could have used a particular word
in a statute but did not, we will not add that word by judicial fiat.”61 The
majority interpreted the statute as it was written and not as it might have
been written using other language.62
The majority made it clear that the Training-or-Experience requirement
had nothing to do with one’s duties within the scope of his or her
employment.63 The only condition that would trigger the statute’s Trainingor-Experience mandate is whether an employee “goes armed while on
duty.”64 According to the court, once the Board allowed a school employee
to carry a firearm on to school grounds, the Training-or-Experience
requirement was triggered, regardless of that employee’s actual job
description.65
The court also rejected amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave
Yost’s argument for a judgment rendered in favor of the Board.66 The
Attorney General argued that since the designated employees were not hired
with the purpose of carrying weapons but were instead volunteering to carry
weapons with the approval of the Board, R.C. 109.78(D) would not apply.67
The majority set aside this argument by saying that the Attorney General
was attempting to assert that the Training-or-Experience requirement is
triggered by the status of one’s employment.68 However, as the court
previously wrote, it is not the nature of the employment or the assigned
responsibility that triggers the statute; instead, whether or not the employee
is “armed while on duty” determines the application of R.C. 109.78(D).69
The Attorney General also argued that, if taken as a whole, R.C 109.78
describes the training required of “special police officers, security guards,
and other persons privately employed in a police capacity.”70 To illustrate
his argument, the Attorney General pointed to other sections of the statute
that refer to the creation of a “peace-officer-private-security fund” that helps
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 236, 2014-Ohio5511, 29 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 26).
62. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1177.
63. Id.
64. Id; § 109.78(D).
65. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1177.
66. Id. at 1177-78.
67. Id. at 1177.
68. Id. at 1177-78.
69. Id; § 109.78(D).
70. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1178.
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pay for training programs for those hired in security-related positions.71 He
also noted that R.C. 109.78(A) states that training programs are to be
established to certify people for “positions as special police, security guards,
or persons otherwise privately employed in a police capacity.”72 Because
the rest of the statute concerned those serving as law enforcement or as
security guards, the Attorney General asked the court to acknowledge that
R.C. 109.78(D) should be limited to apply to those types of positions as
well.73
Again, the court dismissed the Attorney General’s reasoning, saying
that the General Assembly had the power to limit R.C. 109.78(D) to
employees who were specifically hired in some type of type of law
enforcement or security capacity, but it chose not to.74 The court took the
other sections of the statute that specifically addressed those employed “in a
police capacity” as evidence that the General Assembly knew how to tailor
parts of the statute to refer to police-like employees.75 Further, the majority
said that since R.C. 109.78(D) was not modified to specify that it referred to
only those employed “in a police capacity,” the General Assembly must
have intentionally left the statute broader than those other sections.76 In
taking this view, the court refused to attempt to correct what the Attorney
General and some of the dissenting justices saw as inconsistencies within
the statute.77
Using the same logic, the court rejected the Board’s and Justice
DeWine’s argument (from his dissenting opinion) that the statute should be
interpreted using the ejusdem generis rule.78 This rule states that when a
“general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or
phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those
listed.”79 The Board and Justice DeWine asserted that the term “other
position” in the Clause should be limited to those positions sharing some
similar quality with the two previous items in the list: special police officer
and security guard.80 Using ejusdem generis as a basis, they claimed that
the similar quality connecting the list is “law enforcement or the protection
of others and the inherent necessity to be armed while performing such

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.78(C) (2021).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1178; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.78(A) (2021).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1178.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1179.
Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1179.
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duties.”81 Thus, the Board and Justice DeWine defined “other position” as
one that would be police-like in nature.82
However, the majority found that any application of the ejusdem
generis rule was inappropriate, noting that the rule should only be applied
“when the statutory language itself is subject to various interpretations.”83
The court ascertained no ambiguity in the language of the statute, and,
therefore, it rejected any application of a statutory-interpreting device such
as ejusdem generis.84 Furthermore, the majority stated that even if ejusdem
generis were to be applied, it would not produce the result the Board was
seeking.85 The Chief Justice wrote that the statute specifies the shared
quality between special police officers, security guards, and “other
position[s]” in its language: being armed on duty.86 All of these types of
employees are armed while on duty, and, thus, they are required to meet the
Training-or-Experience requirement described within the statute.87
After holding that R.C. 109.78(D) applies to all school employees who
are armed, the court then turned to the Board’s argument that R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a) allowed it to circumvent the Training-or-Experience
requirement.88 R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) describes the types of employees
who are exempt from criminal liability for carrying firearms on to school
premises.89 The Board argued that R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) gave it the
power to authorize any person to carry a weapon on to school grounds and
the freedom to determine the required amount of training for that person.90
Justice Kennedy, in her dissent, agreed with the Board and even called R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a) the “authorizing statute.”91 However, the majority stated
that R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) does not authorize a school board to disregard
other statutory provisions in absolving a person of criminal liability for
carrying a firearm on school property.92 For instance, a person who is
authorized by a board of education to carry a concealed handgun on school
premises must still have his or her license for concealed carry.93 Using the
same logic, the court held that while R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) gave the Board
the authority to grant a person the ability to be armed on school grounds,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1179.
Id. at 1179-80.
Id.
Id. at 1180.
§ 2923.122(D)(1)(a).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1180.
Id. at 1180, 1183.
Id. at 1181.
Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.12(A) (2021).
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that person would still be bound by the statutory requirements of R.C.
109.78(D).94
Despite the arguments of the Board, the court determined that there was
no conflict between R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) and R.C. 109.78(D).95 The
Board claimed that enforcement of the Training-or-Experience requirement
of R.C. 109.78(D) impeded its authority to designate armed school
employees.96 However, the court rejected this notion, saying that the Board
was still free to authorize whomever it saw fit to carry a concealed weapon
on school premises but that those individuals must satisfy the Training-orExperience requirements before coming to school armed.97
The majority ignored the policy arguments of the Board, the Parents,
and the amici curiae about whether teachers should be armed, and, if so,
what training should be required.98
The court left these policy
considerations for the legislature.99 The court also acknowledged that it is
possible that the two statutes may “fit together imperfectly” since R.C.
109.78(D) was enacted in 1969, whereas R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) was
enacted in 1992.100 However, since the unambiguous language of each
statute is not in conflict with the other, both statutes must be applied
verbatim.101 The Chief Justice insisted that if the statutes read together
create an unideal result, the General Assembly, not the courts, should act to
amend the situation.102
In the end, the court determined that the statutory requirements are
clear.103 R.C. 109.87(D) mandates that in order for a school employee to be
armed while performing his or her required duties, he or she must have
successfully completed a peace officer training program or have at least
twenty years of experience as a peace officer.104 R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a)
does not allow a school board to avoid that requirement.105 Therefore, since
the Board’s resolution did not require the Training-or-Experience
mentioned in R.C. 109.78(D), the resolution violated the statute.106 Because
of this violation, the court affirmed the Twelfth District’s judgment.107
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1182.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1182-83.
Id. at 1183.
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B. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kennedy
In the first of three dissenting opinions, Justice Kennedy began by
saying that in order for the majority to form its opinion, it read R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a) in pari materia with R.C. 109.78(D).108 In pari materia
is a canon of statutory interpretation in which statutes that relate to the same
subject matter may be “construed together, so that inconsistencies in one
statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same
subject.”109 Justice Kennedy, however, decried the use of in pari materia,
saying that the canon should only be used when “one of the statutes
expressly refers to the other or the statute being construed is ambiguous and
both statutes relate to the same subject matter.”110 In her view, these
statutes were not ambiguous, did not expressly refer to each other, and were
not related.111 Therefore, Justice Kennedy stated that the court’s use of in
pari materia was incorrect, and, consequently, she would not have held for
the Parents.112
It is worth noting here that Chief Justice O’Connor, in the majority
opinion, took time to counter Justice Kennedy’s assertion about in pari
materia.113 The Chief Justice disputed Justice Kennedy’s claim that the
majority opinion was based on reading the two statutes at issue in pari
materia.114 In fact, the majority noted that neither the Parents’ merit brief
nor the majority opinion (other than to address Justice Kennedy’s dissent)
ever mentioned the use of the in pari materia canon of statutory
interpretation.115 The majority maintained that its opinion was formed by
reading the plain language of the statutes and by applying the language of
each independently.116 Specifically, the Chief Justice wrote, “[O]ur
understanding of one’s meaning does not depend upon our understanding of
the meaning of the other.”117
Disregarding the majority’s assertion to the contrary, Justice Kennedy
continued her line of reasoning, arguing that R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) should
not be read in pari materia with R.C. 109.78(D).118 She described the
history and use of this linguistic tool, and she reaffirmed her belief that
canons of statutory interpretation should not be used by the court unless
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1183 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In Pari Materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1183.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1176 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1184 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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there is some ambiguity in the text of the statute.119 In the current case,
Justice Kennedy found that in pari materia should not be used for three
reasons: 1) R.C. 2923.122 does not explicitly refer to R.C. 109.78(D) in any
of its sections, 2) R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) is unambiguous, and 3) even if
R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) were ambiguous, the two statutes do not relate to
each other and, thus, should not be read in pari materia.120
First, she discussed the lack of a specific reference to R.C. 109.78(D)
within R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a).121 She highlighted another section of R.C.
2923.122 that referred to R.C. 109.801 and took this reference as evidence
that the legislature knew of the existence of R.C. Chapter 109.122 Thus, she
concluded that since lawmakers knew of R.C. Chapter 109 but did not
expressly refer to R.C. 109.78(D) in R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a), the two
statutes should not be read in pari materia.123 Justice Kennedy wrote that if
the General Assembly had intended for a school board to only authorize
school employees to be armed via R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) after they had
gone through the Training-or-Experience requirements of R.C. 109.78(D),
the legislature would have specifically referred to R.C. 109.78(D) in the
language of R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a).124 In Justice Kennedy’s view, the fact
that there was no such mention of R.C. 109.78(D) in R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a) indicated that the legislature had no intention of
requiring school employees to satisfy the Training-or-Experience
requirement.125 This factor contributed to Justice Kennedy’s determination
that the majority should not have used in pari materia.126
Second, this dissent stated that R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) is plain and
unambiguous and, therefore, in no need of any statutory-interpreting device
such as in pari materia.127 Unlike the majority, Justice Kennedy saw R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a) as “the authorizing statute,” saying that it allowed a
school board, without any limitations, to designate individuals to carry
weapons on school premises.128 She stated that the majority made a misstep
when it began by examining R.C. 109.78(D) instead of starting with R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a).129 In her view, the court should have read the plain
language of R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) and should have seen that the text
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 1185.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1185.
Id. at 1186.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1187.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1187.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol48/iss2/9

12

Gudorf: Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. Of Edn. 179 N.E.3d 1169

2022]

GABBARD V. MADISON LOCAL SCHOOL DIST.

461

clearly gave school boards total authority to arm its employees without any
need to satisfy R.C. 109.78(D).130 According to Justice Kennedy, since
R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) was unambiguous, there was no reason for the
majority to consider any other statute in pari materia.131
Third, Justice Kennedy argued that even if there had been an express
reference of one of the two statutes in the other or if R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a)
had been ambiguous, the two statutes were unrelated to each other.132 Since
the two statutes did not cover the same subject matter, they should not be
read in pari materia.133 Justice Kennedy interpreted the two statutes as very
different from one another.134 She saw R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) as a statute
that allowed a school board to absolve school employees from criminal
liability for being armed on school grounds.135 On the other hand, it was her
view that R.C. 109.78 as a whole was a statute governing the “certification
and training of special police officers and security guards.”136 She asserted
that R.C. 109.78(D) did “not speak to a situation in which a school district
decides to permit a person [already employed] to carry a firearm on school
grounds” and only governed situations in which an employee was hired “as
a de facto police officer.”137 According to Justice Kennedy, because the two
statutes are unrelated, they should not be read in pari materia.138
Justice Kennedy also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of
“other position” in the Clause.139 She found that “other position” was meant
to refer to an employee “acting in a police capacity.”140 Under this
understanding of “other position,” the Training-or-Experience requirement
would only apply to an employee who was hired as a “de facto police
officer.”141 Therefore, Justice Kennedy would not require the language of
R.C. 109.78(D) to be applied to teachers, administrators, or other school
employees not involved in law enforcement or security.142
Justice Kennedy found that the majority opinion was only possible
through an interpretation of the statutes using in pari materia.143 Despite
the majority countering this view and claiming that it had used no such
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1187-88.
Id. at 1188.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1188.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1189-90.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1188.
Id. at 1189-90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1190.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1183.
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canon, Justice Kennedy listed the reasons why in pari materia was
inappropriate for this particular case.144 In the end, Justice Kennedy
described R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) as being clear-cut and not in need of any
other statute for reference.145 Based on this reading of the statute, the
Board’s resolution should not have been evaluated under a reading of R.C.
109.78(D), and, thus, the ten designated employees should not have to
satisfy the Training-or-Experience requirement.146 Therefore, Justice
Kennedy would have reversed the Twelfth District’s judgment and held for
the Board.147
C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Fischer
After a brief discussion of the court’s role in interpreting statutes and
not in making policies as the General Assembly does, Justice Fischer’s
dissenting opinion began by stating his agreement with the third dissenting
opinion written by Justice DeWine.148 He agreed with Justice DeWine that
R.C. 109.78(D) should only apply to “those individuals who are employed
in a security capacity.”149 However, he described expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, another canon of statutory interpretation that could be
used to reach Justice DeWine’s conclusion.150
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a rule that says, “[T]o express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.”151 Justice Fischer
explained that this “canon does not apply to every statutory listing or
grouping.”152 Specifically, “it has force only when the items expressed are
members of an ‘associated group or series,’ justifying the inference that
items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence.”153
The statute in question, R.C. 109.78(D), detailed that any “special
police officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes
armed while on duty” must satisfy the Training-or-Experience mandate.154
Thus, in Justice Fischer’s reading, special police officers and security
guards would be understood as members of the same group.155 Since
144. Id. at 1185; Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1176 (majority opinion).
145. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1187-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1190.
147. Id.
148. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1190 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1190-91.
150. Id.
151. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
152. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1191.
153. Id. (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168, 123 S.Ct. 748, 154 L.Ed.2d
653 (2003)).
154. § 109.78(D).
155. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1191.
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teachers and other non-security personnel were never mentioned in the
statute, Justice Fischer used expresso unius est exclusion alterius and argued
that they were deliberately excluded from the list and not meant to be held
to the Training-or-Experience requirement of R.C. 109.78(D).156
Based on expresso unius est exclusion alterius and the arguments made
in Justice DeWine’s dissent, Justice Fischer would have reversed the
Twelfth District and ruled for the Board.157
D. Dissenting Opinion by Justice DeWine
Justice DeWine began his dissenting opinion by arguing that the
majority refused to read R.C. 109.78(D) for its plain language and instead
“adopt[ed] a strained reading of the statute that is at odds with the way
ordinary speakers of the English language read texts.”158 He interpreted
R.C. 109.78(D) to apply only to individuals “employed in a security-related
position.”159 Because of this understanding of the statute, Justice DeWine
would have held for the Board.160
Looking at the Clause, Justice DeWine wrote that a teacher is not a
“position in which such person goes armed while on duty.”161 He argued
that “going armed on duty is not part of the ‘position’ of being a teacher,”
specifically saying that “carrying firearms is not part of [a teacher’s] job
description.”162 Therefore, he disagreed with the majority’s interpretation
of the Clause, which necessitated that all employees authorized to carry
firearms on school premises be subjected to R.C. 109.78(D).163
Another reason that Justice DeWine believed the majority came to the
wrong conclusion was that it interpreted each word in the Clause
individually rather than comprehending the statute as a whole.164 He wrote
that the majority, “by zeroing in on each word in isolation . . . los[t] its
grasp on the meaning of the provision as a whole.”165
When examining the text of R.C. 109.78, Justice DeWine began with
the notion that the statute described whom a school may employ.166
According to him, the statute does not detail what requirements must be met
for a person who is employed by a school and who then “just happens to ‘go
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 1190-91.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1192 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.; § 109.78(D).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1192.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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armed’ while working in that position.”167 Because the statute concerned
whom the school could employ, Justice DeWine differed from the majority,
saying that the reason for which the person was employed by the school is
essential to the triggering of R.C. 109.78(D).168 According to Justice
DeWine’s interpretation, if a person were employed for the purpose of
being armed, then the statute would apply.169 If a person were employed for
another purpose but then was subsequently authorized to be armed, the
statute would not apply.170
Justice DeWine also argued that the majority’s interpretation of R.C.
109.78(D) would make much of the statute redundant.171 He asserted that
the statute limits who may be employed by a school, and that if “other
position” can be read to include teachers, they would obviously already
have been employed by the school.172 According to Justice DeWine, if the
Clause were read broadly to include anyone employed by the school, it
would “swallow up” the previously listed positions of special police officer
and security guard, who are also employed by the school.173 Thus, to avoid
redundancy, he found that R.C. 109.78(D) should be understood to refer
only to “security-related position[s].”174
Next, Justice DeWine applied the ejusdem generis canon of statutory
interpretation to R.C. 109.78(D).175 He disagreed with both the majority’s
refusal to apply the canon and its assertion that, even if applied, the canon
would not change the majority’s understanding of the applicability of R.C.
109.78(D) to school employees.176 By using ejusdem generis, Justice
DeWine concluded that “other position” in the Clause must be read in
context with the previous items in the list, special police officers and
security guards.177 He contended that the position must refer to something
“security-related,” leaving teachers outside of the scope of the statute’s
reach.178
Justice DeWine continued by stating that R.C. 109.78 is part of a
chapter of the Revised Code that addresses the “training and certification of
law-enforcement and peace officers.”179 Specifically, R.C. 109.78 begins
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1193-94.
Id. at 1194
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1195
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1196.
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by establishing “training programs and certification for people privately
employed in a police capacity.”180 In Justice DeWine’s view, “R.C.
109.78(D) is nestled in a statute solely addressing training for people
privately employed in a security or police capacity.”181 Looking at the
statute in its entirety, rather than in pieces as he claimed the majority did,
Justice DeWine read the statute as governing the requirements of peace
officers and not of school employees such as teachers and administrators.182
Justice DeWine went further, rejecting the majority’s insistence that if
R.C. 109.78(D) was meant to be applied to only those employed in securityrelated positions, then the legislature “should have used the phrase
‘employed in a police capacity,’” a phrase that was used in other sections of
the statute.183 He accused the majority of relying on the canon of statutory
interpretation known as the “presumption of consistent usage.”184 This
canon states that “a word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout a text . . . unless a material variation in terms suggests a
variation in meaning.”185 Justice DeWine argued that this canon should not
have been used since he found overwhelming evidence that the text
supported an interpretation that R.C. 109.78 referred to people employed in
police-like positions.186 Although the General Assembly did not use the
phrase “employed in a police capacity” in R.C. 109.78(D), Justice DeWine
did not read the lack of this phrase as a clear intention on the part of the
legislature to broaden the Training-or-Experience requirement to all school
employees who might be armed.187 He found that the use of the phrase in
other sections of the statute was sufficient to narrow R.C. 109.78(D) to
those “employed in a police capacity.”188
Finally, Justice DeWine disputed the majority’s assertion that canons of
statutory interpretation should only be used after finding a text to be
ambiguous.189 He maintained that courts have always been allowed to use
“intrinsic linguistic tools to understand a statute’s plain meaning” and that
they should continue to be able to do so.190 He highlighted several past
instances when the Ohio Supreme Court used various canons to “understand
and explain the plain meaning of a text.”191 He argued that most canons are
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. (citing § 109.78(A)).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1196.
Id.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Presumption of Consistent Usage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1197.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1198.
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“merely descriptions of how we naturally interpret language to begin with,”
and “it is simply not the case that we must first declare a text ambiguous in
order to rely on [canons].”192
Justice DeWine found that R.C. 109.78(D) did nothing to forbid school
boards from authorizing school employees to carry concealed weapons on
school premises.193 He would hold in favor of the Board and would not
require teachers to undergo the Training-or-Experience requirement
mandated by R.C. 109.78(D).194
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

One of the nation’s most pressing needs is to provide some type of
remedy or solution to the problem of mass shootings, particularly in
schools.195 As the Chief Justice cited in the beginning of her opinion, there
were approximately 180 shootings in the nation’s schools from 2009 to
2019, claiming the lives of over a hundred students, teachers, and
administrators and injuring many more.196 States across the nation are
implementing a variety of strategies to bolster schools’ defenses and to
protect students and school employees.197 Many states have introduced
legislation to arm teachers and other school employees, but Ohio is not one
of those states.198
While possible solutions for gun violence in schools are passionately
debated, this case hardly entertained any of these potential fixes.199 In fact,
Gabbard, rather than being a vehicle for the judiciary to weigh in on these
matters, was really just a case about statutory interpretation and the role of
the courts. However, in arguing about how R.C. 109.78(D) and R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a) should be interpreted, the court chose to ignore opposing
views about how best to bolster schools’ defenses.200
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1199.
194. Id.
195. See generally Walker, supra note 1.
196. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1172 (majority opinion) (citing Walker, supra note 1).
197. See John Woodrow Cox & Steven Rich, Armored School Doors, Bulletproof Whiteboards
and Secret Snipers, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/school-shootings-and-campus-safety-industry/.
198. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1173 (citing Council of State Governments Justice Center, Arming
Teachers and K-12 School Staff, JUSTICE CENTER (accessed June 1, 2021),
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/NCSL-Arming-Staff-Brief.pdf.
199. See Zeeshan Aleem, Oxford High School Shooting: Guns Are More Important Than the
Motive, MSNBC (Dec. 3, 2021),
https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/oxford-high-school-shooting-guns-are-more-important-motiven1285260.
200. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1182.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol48/iss2/9

18

Gudorf: Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. Of Edn. 179 N.E.3d 1169

2022]

GABBARD V. MADISON LOCAL SCHOOL DIST.

467

In Gabbard, the Ohio Supreme Court attempted to settle issues of
statutory interpretation, providing Ohio citizens with three flawed
approaches and a majority opinion that rightly leaves the policymaking to
the legislature.
B. The Majority Correctly Interpreted the Two Statutes
At the heart of Gabbard was the interpretation and application of two
statutes: R.C. 109.78(D) and R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a).201 Read plainly, it
would seem clear that R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) carves out an exception for
school boards to provide written authorization for certain employees to
carry firearms on to school premises.202 However, nothing in the text of that
statute grants school boards the ability to be able to use this power without
regard for any other laws.203 The Board itself acknowledged this lack of
total authority, conceding that those designated by the Board would still be
required to attain the proper concealed carry licenses issued by the state.204
Just as a statute governing an individual’s ability to carry a concealed
weapon would limit the Board’s authority, so too would other statutes limit
school boards attempting to authorize school employees to be armed under
R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a).205
The majority correctly determined that R.C. 109.78(D) was one of these
other statutes by which the Board’s authority would be limited.206 The plain
language of the statute said that a school could not employ:
[A] person as a special police officer, security guard, or other
position in which such person goes armed while on duty, who has
not received a certificate of having satisfactorily completed an
approved basic peace officer training program, unless the person
has completed twenty years of active duty as a peace officer.207
The majority, without adding any language to the statute, took “other
position” to mean a job other than that of “special police officer” or
“security guard.”208 Furthermore, the Chief Justice wrote that it was not the
nature of the employment that triggered the Training-or-Experience
requirement but whether the employee was “armed while on duty.”209 It
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1180-81; § 2923.122(D)(1)(a).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
§ 109.78 (D).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1176; see also Merit Decision, supra note 34.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1177.
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was the phrase “armed while on duty” that allowed the majority to reject the
arguments from the Board, the Attorney General, and the dissenting justices
that the Clause only applied to those hired in a police-like capacity.210
Based on the majority’s reading of the statute, R.C. 109.78(D) should apply
to any employee of the school, regardless of the purpose for which he or she
was hired, if the employee were required to carry a firearm while continuing
to do his or her other assigned duties.211
C. Flaws in the Dissenting Opinions
The dissenting justices would have the court approach this issue from a
different angle. Each of them chose to use various canons of statutory
interpretation. While it might be argued, as Justice DeWine stated in his
dissent, that the majority also chose to use canons, the majority never stated
the application of any of these statutory interpretation tools in its opinion.212
The majority insisted that its statutory “review ‘starts and stops’ with the
unambiguous statutory language.”213 Finding the language of R.C.
109.78(D) and R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) to be unambiguous, the majority
stated its aversion to employing various canons to “dig deeper than the plain
meaning of an unambiguous statute ‘under the guise of . . . statutory
interpretation.’”214
The dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s unwillingness to
utilize canons of statutory interpretation. Due to their use of various
canons, each of the dissenting opinions requires a significant amount of
inference regarding the intent of the General Assembly.
i. Justice Kennedy Saw R.C. 109.78(D) as Irrelevant to the
Issue
Justice Kennedy would have the court start with what she called the
authorizing statute, R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a).215 She wrote that if one were
to read the plain language of this statute, it would seem obvious that school
boards are given broad and almost limitless authority to designate school
employees to be armed while working.216 Following her reading of R.C.
2923.122(D)(1)(a), she made it clear that her analysis would stop.217
210. Id. at 1178; see also Merit Decision, supra note 34.
211. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1178.
212. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1198 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
213. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1175 (majority opinion) (citing Johnson, 151 Ohio St.3d 75, 2017Ohio-7445, 86 N.E.3d 279 at ¶ 15).
214. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1179 (quoting Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8).
215. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1183 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 1187.
217. Id.
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Because the statute is unambiguous, R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) makes no
reference to R.C. 109.78(D), and the two statutes, in her mind, are
unrelated, she dissented with the majority’s finding that R.C. 109.78(D)
applied.218
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion would have the court only read
R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) and apply it to its fullest extent.219 Instead of
recognizing that the Ohio Revised Code is a collection of statutes, some
possibly applying to the same situation, Justice Kennedy would have the
court read and interpret only the statute most relevant to the problem before
it.220 Here, it would seem clear that the language of both statutes concerns
the ability of employees to be armed in schools.221 Also, as the majority
said, it is quite possible to read both statutes independently and to
understand each statute’s meaning without reliance upon the other.222 As
the Chief Justice wrote, “[I]t is an unremarkable proposition that multiple
statutes might apply to a single factual scenario and that we may not simply
ignore any of those statutes.”223 Because both statutes relate to school
employees who may be armed, it would seem appropriate to read and to
apply both statutes, not in pari materia as Justice Kennedy accused the
majority of doing, but independently and together.224 The majority applied
each statute simultaneously, understanding that R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a)
gives school boards the authority to designate employees to be armed if
those employees satisfy the Training-or-Experience requirement of R.C.
109.78(D).225
Justice Kennedy avoided much of the deep textual interpretation of R.C.
109.78(D) that made up most of the other opinions. By opting to
predominantly consider the implications of R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a), she
essentially decided that this statute should be valued more than R.C.
109.78(D). Did the General Assembly intend for R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) to
supersede R.C. 109.78(D)?
ii. Justice Fischer and Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
Justice Fischer, while joining Justice DeWine’s dissent, determined that
the entire case could have been decided due to the lack of one word in R.C.
109.78(D): “teachers.”226 Using the expressio unius est exclusio alterius
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1187.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1187.
§§109.78(D), 2923.122(D)(1)(a).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1176 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id., Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1183 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1182 (majority opinion).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1191 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
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canon of statutory interpretation, Justice Fischer insisted that the lack of the
word “teachers” in the Clause indicated that the General Assembly never
intended to include educators.227 By this logic, any employee not
specifically mentioned in the statute was intentionally left out.
Justice Fischer’s argument vastly narrowed the reading of the Clause. It
is also questionable whether the use of this canon is even appropriate since
the Clause ends in a “catchall phrase.”228 However, what seems most
troubling about Justice Fischer’s interpretation is his joining Justice
DeWine’s fervent argument encouraging the court to read R.C. 109.78 as a
whole and demanding that it look at all of the statute’s subsections and not
just section (D).229 As part of his argument, Justice DeWine asserted that
the preponderance of the statute dealt with “security-related positions.”230
However, he dismissed the majority’s claim that if R.C. 109.78(D) had been
meant to be limited to peace officers and their like, then the General
Assembly would have used the phrase “employed in a police capacity” as it
had in the remainder of the statute.231 The majority argued that the absence
of this statement showed the General Assembly’s intent to broaden R.C.
109.78(D)’s applicability.232
Here lies the inconsistency in Justice Fischer’s argument. On one hand,
he said that the absence of the word “teachers” showed the intent of the
legislature not to include them under the statute.233 On the other hand, he
joined Justice DeWine in claiming that the absence of the phrase “employed
in a police capacity” was inconsequential.234 How can the absence of the
word “teachers” demonstrate clear legislative intent, yet the lack of the
phrase “employed in a police capacity” not carry that same legislative
intent?
iii. Justice DeWine Insisted That Canons of Statutory
Interpretation Should Be Employed
Justice DeWine’s dissent attempted to poke numerous holes in the
majority’s opinion, starting with the majority’s reading of R.C.
109.78(D).235 He argued that the “other position in which such person goes
227. Id.
228. Jack. L. Landau, Oregon Statutory Construction, 97 OR. L. REV. 583, 689 (2019) (“Unlike
ejusdem generis, though, [expressio unius est exclusio alterius] applies when a statute states a list and
does not end with a general catchall phrase that invites interpreters to add to it.”).
229. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1196 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1197.
231. Id.
232. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1178 (majority opinion).
233. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1191 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
234. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1197 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 1192.
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armed while on duty” could not refer to teachers since teachers are not
employed to carry a weapon.236 However, the majority disputed this claim,
saying that the Clause is not about the duties for which an employee was
hired.237 To make the statute imply that the Clause only applied to those
who were hired to be armed, the majority highlighted that the statute’s
language would have to be changed, possibly to “special police officer,
security guard, or other position ‘the duties of which involve being
armed.’”238
The chief difference in the two opposing interpretations is that the
majority held that the Clause referred to anyone who has duties and then
happens to go armed whereas Justice DeWine maintained that the statute
only applied to those who were hired to be armed. While Justice DeWine
dismissed the majority’s interpretation, saying that it was “interpreting each
word in the phrase in isolation,” Justice DeWine’s reading required the
addition of defining text into the statute.239 The majority found the insertion
of terms into the statute to be an unacceptable option, saying that “if the
General Assembly could have used a particular word in a statute but did not,
we will not add that word by judicial fiat.”240
Justice DeWine also used the canon of ejusdem generis to try to define
“other position” as one that would necessarily be “security-related.”241 The
majority demonstrated that this argument was not persuasive in two ways:
1) this canon and others should only be used when the language of the
statute is ambiguous; and 2) even if it were appropriate to use the canon,
R.C. 109.78(D) would still apply to the Board.242
First, the majority stated that canons of statutory interpretation should
be used “only when the statutory language itself is subject to various
interpretations.”243 However, Justice DeWine also rejected this notion
toward the end of his dissent.244 He argued that canons are constantly used
by the courts in interpreting statutes, and he asserted that the majority,
despite not naming them, used many such “linguistic aids” in its own
interpretation of R.C. 109.78(D).245 He stated that the majority used

236. Id.
237. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1177 (majority opinion).
238. Id.
239. Id.; Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1193 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
240. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1177 (majority opinion) (quoting Hulsmeyer 142 Ohio St.3d 236,
2014-Ohio-5511, 29 N.E.3d 903 at ¶ 26).
241. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at1194-95 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
242. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1179 (majority opinion).
243. Id.
244. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1197 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 1197-98.
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canons stating that words should be given their ordinary meanings
in accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage, that
the text should be read as a whole, that the legislature is presumed
to have meant something different when it uses differing terms, and
that the court should avoid interpretations that fail to give meaning
to every part of the text.246
Whether the majority actually used each of these canons is uncertain
since they were not named in the majority opinion. However, it would seem
that Justice DeWine’s use of ejusdem generis is more than just a “linguistic
aid.” By using the canon, he attempted to change the ordinary meaning of
the phrase “other position” in the Clause.247 Rather than simply looking at
grammar, Justice DeWine was trying to find a common link between
“special police officer,” “security guard,” and “other position in which such
person goes armed while on duty.”248 However, Justice DeWine, toward the
end of his opinion, wrote that “ejusdem generis is ‘one of various factors to
be considered in the interpretation of a text.’”249 While it may be the case
that Justice DeWine considered the use of ejusdem generis as just one more
tool utilized to understand the text, it would appear that much of his analysis
was based on this one canon and his findings from it.
The majority, while dismissing the use of ejusdem generis, held that had
the canon been employed, the statute would still apply to teachers.250 To
use the canon, a common link between the list items would need to be
established.251 Justice DeWine insisted that the common link was that each
item of the list was a “security-related position.”252 However, the Chief
Justice countered that the commonality between the terms was that each
position may go armed while in the course of his or her employment.253
The majority defended its common link by pointing to the plain language of
the statute itself.254 It argued that the General Assembly explicitly stated the
shared characteristic of a “special police officer,” a “security guard,” and an
“other position” when it followed “other position” with the qualifying
phrase “in which such person goes armed while on duty.”255 Rather than
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 1198.
See Id. at 1195.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1194.
Id. at 1198 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 212 (1st ed. 2012)).
250. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1179-80 (majority opinion).
251. Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Landau, supra note
228, at 684.
252. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1195 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
253. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1179-80 (majority opinion).
254. Id. at 1180.
255. Id. at 1179; § 109.78(D).
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trying to infer a commonality as Justice DeWine did in his dissent, the
majority’s view was based on the demonstrable language of the statute.
Finally, Justice DeWine insisted that the entirety of R.C. 109.78 should
be taken into consideration when interpreting section (D).256 He argued that
since the rest of the statute refers to training and funding peace officers,
R.C. 109.78(D) should only refer to “security-related positions.”257 While
he admitted that variations in the statutory language should not be ignored,
he maintained that there was overwhelming evidence that the remainder of
the statute focused on officers in police-like positions.258
This argument appears to be Justice DeWine’s strongest. However, the
majority chose to set his assertion aside and, instead, read the text for what
was actually written.259 In other parts of the statute, Justice DeWine
correctly highlighted that the General Assembly used the phrases
“employed in a police capacity” and “employment in a police capacity.”260
However, the General Assembly did not use these phrases in R.C.
109.78(D).261 Was that omission intentional? While Justice DeWine
decided that these phrases’ absences were possible mistakes by the
legislature, the majority interpreted the text literally and did not assume that
any errors were made.262
While Justice DeWine’s dissenting opinion posed the most challenges
to the majority, it required him to make several inferences about what the
General Assembly intended. Instead, the majority chose to read the text of
the statutes as literally as possible and to apply both. Rather than
attempting to divine legislative intent through extrinsic methods, the
majority tried to apply the law that was written.
V.
CONCLUSION: THE MAJORITY OPINION IS THE BEST POSSIBLE
OUTCOME
It is impossible to know how the majority’s use of statutory
interpretation principles will be used in the future. The three dissenting
opinions and the majority clearly have very differing views about how and
when canons of statutory interpretation should be applied.263 However, the
majority’s plain-English application of both statutes seems to be the most
logical way to interpret the General Assembly’s meaning. Whether the
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1196 (DeWine, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1178 (majority opinion).
§ 109.78(A), (C).
§ 109.78(D).
Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1178.
See generally supra Part III.
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dividing lines that were drawn in the Ohio Supreme Court in Gabbard will
affect the outcome of future cases has yet to be determined.
Had any of the dissenting justices prevailed, the implications for Ohio
schools would have been momentous. School boards across the state would
have the ability not only to designate individuals to go armed, a power
guaranteed by R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a), but also to set the amount of training
required for these individuals to carry a weapon on to school grounds.
What if the Board’s resolution had not been overturned by the court? If
another shooting were to have happened in a school in the Madison Local
School District, special police officers or security guards, who had met the
Training-or-Experience requirement, would have to respond to the active
shooter.264 However, teachers or administrators, who would likely have far
less training and experience in responding to such situations, would also be
required to act.265
Should a teacher or administrator be able to carry a concealed weapon
without meeting the Training-or-Experience requirement? This is a policy
consideration over which Ohio citizens are divided.266 Instead of deciding
which policy was best, the Ohio Supreme Court, by a majority, interpreted
the statutes as literally as possible and chose to “apply both statutes as
written unless and until the General Assembly directs otherwise by
legislative action.”267 The majority indicated it would “neither establish
policy nor second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices” and that
“such arguments are more appropriately directed to the General
Assembly.”268 Instead of infusing school boards with new, nearly limitless
power to arm their staffs, the court chose to keep training requirements for
school employees in line with special police officers and security guards.269
If school boards are to be able to set their own training or experience
requirements in the future, it will be the General Assembly and not the
courts that make those decisions.270 For now, as one of the plaintiffs was
quoted after this ruling, “[P]arents will at least know that the teachers who
carry firearms in our schools are properly trained.”271
DANIEL W. GUDORF
264. Bettman, supra note 13.
265. Id.
266. See generally Should Ohio Teachers Go Armed into Classrooms, per House Bill 99?
CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 20, 2021), https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2021/11/should-ohio-teachers-go
-armed-into-classrooms-per-house-bill-99-editorial-board-roundtable.html.
267. Gabbard, 179 N.E.3d at 1182.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Tebben, supra note 5.
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